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1. Common Readings of Shinran: A Paradigm of Bifurcation
Shinran’s thought has received a sparseness of attention in the West quite out 
of proportion to the originality of his achievement and the place of his Shin 
movement in Japanese society and in the history of Buddhist tradition as a 
whole.1 There is widespread agreement among most commentators that the 
chief reason for this imbalance in modem Western Buddhist studies, even 
given the early marginalization of Japanese Buddhist traditions as being far 
removed from the doctrines and practices of ‘original’ Buddhism, lies in the 
close resemblance of fundamental Shin symbols and concepts to those of 
Protestant Christianity. Jan van Bragt, a Catholic priest with long experience 
in Japan, characterizes the common attitude:
1 Regarding Western interpretations of Shin tradition, see Amstutz 1997.
2 Bragt 1993, p. 47.
[T]he West is mainly interested in Buddhism as its antipode, part­
ly in distrust of its own religious tradition. It is therefore most 
attracted to these forms of Buddhism wherein that antipodal char­
acter appears most clearly—Theravada, Zen, Tibetan Buddhism. 
The Pure Land school, on the other hand, is perceived as very close 
to Christianity and far removed from the mainstream of Buddhism.2
While this general account of the interests of many Western Buddhist schol­
ars may be accurate, I believe that further analysis of the dominant views of 
Shin may be useful, for even in a case like van Bragt’s, awareness of the fun­
damental predisposition that has colored Western attitudes toward Japanese
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Pure Land traditions does not necessarily keep him from adopting the same 
basic assumptions in his own discussion.
In brief, Shin Buddhism has been understood in the West in terms of 
resemblance with Protestant Christianity, where its essential significance has 
been located. Further, this resemblance has in itself been taken to indicate 
removal from Mahayana tradition. Treatment of Shin has therefore been cast 
in an analytic mode o f discussion framed by its similarity or contrast with 
Western and Mahayana traditions. Moreover, such analysis has not been 
simply comparative, but has imposed from the outset an understanding of 
Shin as internally divided, as though religious features wholly familiar to the 
West have been incongruously grafted onto alien roots. Situated thus as a 
kind of hybrid or amalgam between the distinctive poles of Mahayana 
Buddhism and Protestant Christianity, Shin has tended to be judged inher­
ently deficient or underdeveloped with regard to both poles.
In other words, in the standard discussions of Shin Buddhism, including 
that of van Bragt, the elements of Shin have been divided in two, or separat­
ed out into two conceptual bins. On the one hand, there are the religious atti­
tudes and social manifestations that have close correspondences within 
Christian tradition (Karl Barth, in his pioneering discussion of Shin in 
Church Dogmatics, lists: “religion of grace,” “Reformation doctrines of 
original sin, representative satisfaction justification by faith alone, the gift of 
the Holy Ghost and thankfulness”).3 On the other, there are elements that are 
absent, and teachings or symbols that appear distinct from any Christian 
counterpart (Barth states, “we miss any doctrine of the law and also of the 
holiness, or wrath of Amida. . . .  In the Jodo religion it is not Amida or faith 
in him, but this human goal of desire [for nirvana] which is the really con­
trolling and determinative power”). The latter characteristic of aspiration for 
enlightenment is generally understood to represent the attitude of “main­
stream Buddhism” or “general Mahayana.” In short, Shin is grasped as a tra­
dition whose evolution has dislodged it somehow from general Buddhist 
soil, making it comprehensible only by situating it somewhere between 
Christianity and more “mainstream” Buddhism.
3 Barth 1961, vol. I, 2: p. 342.
4 I have discussed Barth’s exposition in Hirota 2000, pp. 34-38. This book of articles was 
originally presented and discussed at a symposium at the Graduate Theological Union in 
1996.
As I have discussed elsewhere, I find Barth’s lists both of similarities and 
differences insightful4 Nevertheless, his apologetic use of Shin Buddhism
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finally to locate and underwrite the transcendent uniqueness of Christianity 
prevented him from probing Shinran’s thought. In his view, the entire signif­
icance of Shin tradition lies in its similarities with Christianity—which only 
highlight its character as a merely human creation and thus a foil to what he 
sees as true religion. Although Barth’s discussion may now appear exces­
sively polemical, Jan van Bragt also expounds the same basic model of Shin 
as double in nature:
The Buddhist Pure Land school contains within itself an unresolv- 
able, living, and possibly creative, tension between its own partic­
ular religiosity and the mainstream of Buddhism. When going 
away too far from that mainstream, it is apt to fall into a kind of 
folk religion that is hardly recognizable as Buddhism. But on the 
other hand, when trying to stick too closely to the logic of that 
mainstream, it tends to lose its own originality and religious 
dynamism—as well as its inner affinity with Christianity.5
According to this view, the “particular religiosity” or “religious dynamism” 
of Shin Buddhism lies in those elements that at once lend it an “inner affini­
ty with Christianity” and bring it into tension with “the mainstream of 
Buddhism.”
There are different ways of handling this model of internal polarization, 
but the central question here is less the particular manner in which it is 
shaped than the effect of taking it as a starting point for understanding Shin. 
This is because once the conceptual split is made, there seems to be little 
interest in an understanding that reintegrates the divided elements or recog­
nizes them as adequate in comparison to the polar traditions.
A subtle extension of this same model is found in the field of interreligious 
dialogue. In an ingenious sleight of hand, it is argued that Western scholars 
need to uphold the basic character of Shin in the face of “elitist” or “mod­
ernist” Shin scholars who may resist the notion that their tradition is in 
essence similar to Christian religiosity, and who may stubbornly insist on 
continuities with Mahayana tradition. In this view, the original bifurcation of 
Shin is once again simply assumed, and once again the significance of Shin 
tradition is located in its likeness to Christianity. What is new is the justifi­
cation of these moves by labeling resemblance to Christian religiosity “Shin 
specificity” and nonresemblance “mainstream Buddhism.” Thus, for Shin
5 Bragt 1993, p. 56.
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Buddhists to give weight instead to elements of their tradition dissimilar to 
Christianity—for example, the aspiration to realize nirvana that Barth 
notes—amounts to a “reductionist” act of effacement of what is distinctive­
ly Shin. It has even been suggested that Mahayana thought stands in a rela­
tion to Shin religiosity analogous to the relationship of Greek philosophy and 
Christianity.6 In this view, as with Barth and others, Shin would seem to have 
its center in a Christian-like religiosity, and to stand in distant and uncertain 
relation to Mahayana tradition.
2. Readings of The Collected Works o f  Shinran
As stated above, Shin has often been dealt with in the West by the imposition 
of a kind of internal polarization, or by situating it in relation to, and at some 
point between, the more stable and integral coordinates of Protestant 
Christianity and general Mahayana Buddhism. The problem is not with a 
comparative method, which may be both effective and inevitable. Further, 
the view of Shin against the backdrop o f a contrast between Mahayana 
Buddhist thought and Protestant religiosity is not necessarily entirely with­
out grounds. It turns on the apparent shift in emphasis from meditative and 
other practices to eradicate delusional attachments in many Mahayana tradi­
tions to a conception of “shinjin,” or the entrusting of oneself to the wisdom­
compassion of Amida Buddha, in the Shin tradition. In the West, however, 
this shift has been perceived as moving across an insuperable breach, there­
by distancing the Pure Land teaching irrevocably from Mahayana tradition 
and bringing it, despite its use of traditional Buddhist symbols and concepts, 
into broad alignment with forms of religiosity similar to, and properly 
accommodated within the frameworks of, a Protestant Christian outlook.
I wonder if it is not time to reconsider the assumption that progressive 
refining of this comparative framework will lead to deepened understanding 
of Shin tradition and its significance. Is it not necessary to devise a new 
approach to understanding—an approach that enables contemporary access 
to the resources of thought and religious life within the tradition? This would 
bring the historical manifestations and traditional formulations o f teaching 
and practice into interaction with contemporary perspectives—whether 
Western (including Christian) or Asian—seeking to create an exposition of 
Shin Buddhism that genuinely deepens our present understanding of the tra­
dition. The question I wish to focus on here is: How is it possible to move
6 Ibid., p. 58.
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beyond the paradigm of bifurcation and polarization for grasping Shin?
Let us begin by considering the readings of John Keenan and Thomas 
Kasulis in relation to this question. Though widely dissimilar in approach, 
both discussions may be viewed as inheriting issues that have previously 
arisen within the framework of bifurcation described above. Keenan raises 
the question of the relation of Shinran to general Mahayana thought by 
focusing on the absence of direct reference to “emptiness” or sunyata in 
Shinran’s writings. Thomas Kasulis, deliberately adopting a stance o f “priv­
ileging the Asian over the Eurocentric” (p. 17, footnote), explores Shin’s 
apparent lack of ethical norms, one of the most common and persistent criti­
cisms of Shin thought brought by Christian theologians, but with an eye to 
hints in Shinran for our contemporary situation. Interestingly, despite their 
differences, both authors have recourse to the notions of mappd and o f myth­
ic narrative in addressing the problems they raise. I will begin with brief con­
sideration of the two articles.
Shinran’s Thought and Emptiness
John Keenan points out that the pivotal Mahayana concept of emptiness 
plays little direct role in Shinran’s writings. According to Keenan, this is a 
matter of critical significance, for the doctrine of the emptiness of all things 
is central to Mahayana philosophy. He therefore asks: Why does Shinran 
ignore the doctrine of emptiness?
Keenan’s approach resembles the paradigmatic interpretation of Shin out­
lined above, for he grasps Shinran in terms of a departure from general 
Mahayana thinking. I would suggest, however, that a shift of perspective in 
Keenan’s own approach to emptiness may be useful in grasping Mahayana 
thought, and that this shift results in eliminating the implied divergence from 
basic Mahayana thinking that he emphasizes in Shinran. Keenan speaks 
repeatedly of the “doctrine of emptiness,” tending to find in “the emptiness 
of all things” a metaphysical assertion. For him, emptiness is a mode of 
“logic” or a “pattern of philosophic thought” that functions in the realm of 
conceptual comprehension and propositions about the world. I suspect, how­
ever, that even had Shinran employed the term “emptiness,” it would not 
have referred primarily to a doctrine, but would have been used synony­
mously with suchness, dharma-body, nirvana, and so on. In other words, it 
would have referred to reality beyond conceptual grasp, or reality that is real­
ized in the eradication of delusional, dichotomous thinking. Shinran states 
that this reality is “formless.”
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Formless reality or emptiness is characterized by the nonduality of subject 
and object. While Keenan begins with an insistence on the doctrine of empti­
ness as fundamental to Mahayana, it may also be said, approaching the same 
realization of reality from the opposite side of the subject-object dichotomy, 
that a new conception of wisdom lies at the heart of Mahayana, a wisdom 
characterized by a thoroughgoing nonduality. Thus, in awakening, the aspect 
of subjectivity is termed “wisdom” and its object “emptiness.” Why, then, 
does Shinran not refer to emptiness? It is not because he must deny “the 
emptiness of all things.” He prominently quotes T’an-luan (476-542), for 
example, who expresses emptiness in the following passage without express­
ly naming it:
In saving beings, one perceives no object of salvation. The bod­
hisattva, in observing sentient beings, sees that in the final analysis 
they are nonexistent. Although he saves countless sentient beings, 
in reality there is not a single sentient being who realizes nirvana. 
Manifesting the act of saving sentient beings is thus like play.7
The “nonexistence” of the object of wisdom-compassion expresses empti­
ness as nonduality. Rather than emptiness as a proposition about the world, 
the operative word for Shinran would have been practice. The bodhisattva 
practices wisdom by transcending dichotomous thought and perception and 
thereby sees emptiness. For Shinran, as indeed for Mahayana tradition, 
emptiness was regarded as an aspect of contemplative practice, not a meta­
physical principle to be grasped merely intellectually by ordinary thought. 
The “logic of emptiness” or “pattern of philosophic thought” that Keenan 
refers to should perhaps also be understood as basically an element of medi­
tative practice directed to the transcendence of dichotomous thought.
In short, Shinran does not expound emptiness precisely because he does 
not teach a path to Buddhahood in which it is an element or concretization of 
practice. His concern is to articulate an alternative path to awakening, one 
that does not require the fulfillment of meditative practice. The question, 
therefore, is not “Why does Shinran neglect emptiness?” but “How does 
reality that is referred to as emptiness in other forms of Mahayana tradition 
disclose itself in Shinran’s path?”
As stated above, emptiness should not be considered a metaphysical prin­
ciple standing apart from the practice of wisdom; emptiness is what the bo-
7 “Chapter on Realization,” Teaching, Practice, and Realization, CWS I: 174.
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dhisattva practicing wisdom sees. Here, emptiness and wisdom arise togeth­
er. This nonduality also characterizes reality as it discloses itself in Shinran’s 
path through the functioning of the Pure Land mythic narrative. In other 
words, engagement with the narrative may be seen to fulfill the function that 
meditative practices fulfill in other Buddhist paths, and to lead to an appre­
hension of reality that is characterized by nonduality, a nonduality that is 
apprehended as emptiness in other forms of Mahayana.
The fundamental difference is that in Shinran’s Pure Land Buddhist path, 
delusional thinking is not eradicated. As he states: “Our desires are count­
less, and anger, wrath, jealousy, and envy are overwhelming, arising without 
pause; to the very last moment of life they do not cease, or disappear, or 
exhaust themselves.”8 This is life pervaded by blind passions, which Shinran 
sees as the fundamental mode of human existence. At the same time, the 
awakening to such existence is accompanied by a transformation, which 
Shinran speaks of repeatedly. He states, for example: “The minds, good and 
evil, of foolish beings . . .  are immediately transformed into the mind of great 
compassion.”9 Or: “Evil karma, without being nullified or eradicated, is 
made into good, just as all river waters, upon entering the great ocean, imme­
diately become ocean water.” 10 The delusional thinking of ignorant beings is 
transformed into wisdom-compassion without ceasing to be delusional 
thinking; evil karma is transformed into virtue without being eradicated. This 
is the mode of the disclosure of the nonduality of blind passions and enlight­
enment, or samsaric existence and nirvana that in other forms of Mahayana 
thought is expressed, “Form is none other than emptiness; emptiness is none 
other than form.”
8 Notes on Once-Calling and Many-Calling, CWS I: 488.
9 Hymns o f the Dharma-Ages, CWS I: 408.
10 Notes on ‘Essentials o f Faith Alone’, CWS I: 453.
Shinran states that transformation occurs of itself, without any calculation 
on the part of the practicer. Or perhaps, the falling away of calculative think­
ing with regard to the teaching and the emergence of the world in which “our 
desires are countless, and anger, wrath, jealousy, and envy arise without 
pause” occur together and are in themselves transformative and disclosive of 
reality. Here, there is a concomitant duality and nonduality of sentient being 
and Buddha, or this world and the Pure Land. Further, Amida Buddha is both 
form disclosed by formlessness, and inconceivable.
It is impossible to discuss here how such transformation might occur in
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engagement with the narratives of the Pure Land path.11 Keenan states, 
however, that Shinran “cannot grant privilege to the language of emptiness, 
which in many traditions functions as a metalanguage emptying all language 
claims of their final validity.” I wonder if it is not “language of emptiness” 
itself that can function to “empty all language claims,” but engagement with 
that language of emptiness, which is meditative practice that breaks through 
discursive thought carried on in ordinary language. As Keenan notes, in the 
Pure Land path delineated by Shinran one does not break through the delu­
sional linguisticality that he sees as characterizing human existence and 
apprehend emptiness. Nevertheless, there is a metalanguage that works to 
empty all language claims of their final validity, for this is the function of the 
nembutsu.12 The Name arises as the horizon of human existence and per­
vades all our ordinary use of language. This is what Shinran means when he 
states: “With a foolish being full of blind passions, in this fleeting world— 
this burning house—all matters without exception are empty and false, total­
ly without truth and sincerity. The nembutsu alone is true and real.” Or: “The 
medicine of Amida’s Vow destroys the poisons of our wisdom and foolish­
ness.” 13 14
11 I have taken up this topic in Hirota 1991 and Hirota 2000.
12 See Hirota 1993.
13 For the first quotation, see Hirota 1982, p. 44 and CWS I: 679; for the second, “Chapter 
on Shinjin,” Teaching, Practice, and Realization, CWS I: 107.
14 Ueda and Hirota 1989.
15 Some of the emphases are not represented in most Japanese writings, and several ele­
ments of it, such as the expostion of Shinran’s conception of karma, have been controversial. 
See Ueda 1986.
Evil and the Postmodern Consciousness
Kasulis’ reading of Shinran in large part parallels the exposition given in the 
central glossary entries of CWS and in Shinran: An Introduction to His 
Thought'^ although not noted by Kasulis, this includes some elements that 
remain controversial in Japan.15 What is particularly valuable in his article, 
however, is his systematic comparison of Shinran with postmodernist 
thought, and his suggestion that the ethical thinking found in Shinran m ay be 
helpful in pondering our contemporary situation. Kasulis’ strategy may be 
seen as an end-run around one of the major obstacles to an appreciation of 
Japanese Pure Land thought for modem students: an apparent emphasis on 
human powerlessness and evil (in the Buddhist sense of all action that leads
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to further entanglement in samsaric existence and not to awakening) that has 
seemed to many readers in the West so extreme as to extirpate its Buddhist 
character. This emphasis is often interpreted to mean that the Japanese Pure 
Land teaching was Buddhism tailored for the masses, who had no access to 
the path save faith, since they were incapable of study and unwilling to 
devote themselves to practice.
Kasulis’ article makes two basic moves in relation to this issue. First, by 
taking as his emphasis the notion of mappo, he brings about a shift of the 
focal point of evil from the individual practicer to the age or environment. In 
this way he softens the Pure Land assertion of personal powerlessness to 
achieve enlightenment. Second, by bringing a concept of “mappo-con- 
sciousness” into comparison with “postmodern consciousness,” he is able to 
formulate a contemporary stance for grasping the notion of mappo, which 
has seemed unjustifiably pessimistic to the modem mindset. Regarding 
Kasulis’ overall aim of drawing from Shinran’s thought hints for our own 
postmodern ethics, one cannot help wondering whether his concluding 
remarks regarding Shinran’s discovery of “the compassion that is as univer­
sal and alive as Amitayus, as unhindered and bright as Amitabha” (p. 33) are 
genuinely persuasive, or whether reliance on such transcendent agency 
might not seem to a hardened postmodem mind little more than clutching to 
old metanarratives. Here, however, I will focus on the question, raised 
above, of whether Kasulis’ approach provides a way of leading us beyond an 
initial bifurcation in approaching Shinran.
Viewed in terms of the paradigmatic approach to Shinran sketched in sec­
tion 1 above, Kasulis’ discussion may be seen as displacing Shinran’s 
thought from close proximity to the Protestant pole and moving it some dis­
tance towards the Mahayana. This realignment allows for a stance in Shin 
that contrasts with a number of modernist assumptions (which Kasulis care­
fully outlines) and that affords comparison with postmodern thinking. The 
resulting delineation of points of convergence between Shinran and post­
modern thought is cogent and illuminating. From a Shin perspective, how­
ever, there appears to be a large price to pay for the incorporation of the 
postmodern mind as a form of ma/2/20-consciousness. Thus, although Kasulis 
speaks of “privileging the Asian over the Eurocentric . . .  by interpreting 
postmodem consciousness as a form of mczfpo-consciousness” (p. 17, foot­
note), one must ask whether there are not areas of “wM/jpo-consciousness” 
that fall by the wayside because they find no corresponding elements in 
“postmodern consciousness” to support comparison.
46
H lR O T A : ON R EC E N T  R EA D IN G S OF SH IN RA N
A full consideration of Kasulis’ wide-ranging exposition is not possible 
here, and, as stated before, on the whole its presentation of Shinran appears 
both apposite and succinct. Further, he moves in the direction of overcoming 
the imposition of internal dichotomy by taking Shinran’s conception of 
mappd as a point of departure. My concern, however, is with what this pro­
cedure tends to eliminate from consideration. In a word, Kasulis dispenses 
with Shinran’s thoroughgoing conception of evil, which both modem and 
postmodem consciousness appears to find indigestible and which has long 
prevented Westerners from accepting Shin as genuine Buddhism. My con­
cern is not simply that a prominent concept in Shinran appears neglected, but 
rather that precisely that concept that is crucial to a unitive view of Shinran’s 
thought has dropped from consideration.
Kasulis takes up the concept of evil through a consideration of the best- 
known statement in Tannisho, “Even a good person attains birth in the Pure 
Land, so it goes without saying that an evil person will.” 16 Kasulis is surely 
correct when he states that “Shinran is not talking about people in terms of 
an external standard of good and evil, but rather is referring to the way peo­
ple view themselves” (p. 26). Shinran says as much in his own explanation 
the statement. For Kasulis, however, this perspective is taken as justifying 
the paraphrase: “Even do-gooders may be bom in the Pure Land; how much 
more so those who are not.” We find here that the term “evil” turns into a 
mere negative—not perceiving oneself as a “do-gooder”—while for Shinran 
the expression surely means, “How much more so those who are evil-doers. ”
Deemphasis of Shinran’s conception of evil results in a broad sense of 
mappd ranging from “Kamakura mappo” as the consciousness of the age to 
Shinran’s existential awareness of mappd. From a Shin perspective, howev­
er, it may be useful to distinguish two kinds o f “m<2/?/?o-consciousness,” one 
arising from an intellectual grasp of the teaching and the other reflecting a 
religious transformation. The nature of the issue may be illustrated in the fol­
lowing way. In relation to “nrappo-consciousness,” Kasulis speaks repeated­
ly of “relinquishing all sense of self-agency” so that one “relinquishes 
karmic conditionedness” (p. 34). “If I give up that [conditioned] ‘I,’ there is 
only the working of the Vow” (ibid.). The question is: How does one give up 
the ‘I ’?
16 Hirota 1982, p. 23; CWS I: 663. Note that this statement is not Shinran’s original expres­
sion, but is found elsewhere attributed to Honen (Daigobon Honen Shonin Denki, section 7).
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From a postmodern perspective, perhaps, as well as from a perspective of 
the Path of Sages (for example, Zen), one abandons the self through acts of 
practice or through a religious decision. In the Japanese Pure Land tradition, 
we see an example of such self-abandonment in Ippen, and Kasulis’ expres­
sion for the achieved state, “there is neither Amida nor Shinran,” is indeed 
reminiscent of Ippen.17 From Shinran’s perspective, however, belief that 
such an act or decision is possible is unduly optimistic. It is here that Shinran 
parts company with the above traditions. For Shinran, it is precisely the 
inability to accomplish such self-abandonment that binds one to samsaric 
existence. Further, it is this inability that Shinran terms “evil.”
17 Cf. the poem attributed to Ippen: “Say the nembutsu/ and there is neither/ Buddha nor 
self/ Namu-amida-butsu/ Namu-amida-butsu,” Hirota 1989, p. 66. For a comparison of the 
thought of Ippen and Shinran, see pp. Ixxii-lxxvi of this book.
18 Hirota 2000, p. 164.
Kasulis states: “ Shinran’s deep sense of mappo convinced him that such a 
plan [as the Path of Sages] could never work for him. So he entrusted him­
self completely to the exemplar of his mentor, Honen, and in so doing, 
entrusted himself to the working of Amida’s Vow” (p. 28). Shinran does 
state in Tannishd 2 that he entrusts himself utterly to the words of his teacher 
Honen. He goes on, however, to explain the difference between faith as a 
choice of a course of action based on the conviction of the truth of a teaching 
(what his followers have come in order to seek from him) and his own real­
ization of shinjin as entrusting in which “nothing else is involved.” In the 
case of his attainment of shinjin, even if he were deceived by Honen’s words, 
he would feel no regret, “for hell is to be my abode whatever I do.” 
Operative here is a self-awareness not simply of postmodernist perspectival- 
ism, but of evil in Shinran’s sense: to the very end o f life, delusional and dis­
tortive self-attachment does not disappear.
Elsewhere I have stated that at the heart of Shinran’s Pure Land path lies 
an existential Mahayanic awakening to nonduality, manifested in particular 
in the nonduality—without obliteration of the distinction—of falsity and 
truth, or samsaric existence and true reality, or blind passions and wisdom­
compassion. Nonduality concretized in this way—and sustained in the 
awareness of persons who achieve no eradication of false conceptualization 
and self-attachment through meditative practices—is the characteristic qual­
ity of the Shin Buddhist path.18
It is in Shinran’s delineation of the transformation of one’s existence into
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evil (blind passions) that is at the same time nondual with wisdom-compas­
sion (Amida Buddha) that we find the answer to the question, posed above, 
of how one relinquishes attachment to self. Such relinquishment arises of 
itself in the awakening to the evil of one’s existence as a human being. As we 
have seen above, the disregard of emptiness as an appropriate element of 
practice and the view of human existence as involved in evil (delusional self­
attachment; blind passions; false conceptuality) are closely related in 
Shinran’s thought. Thus, raising the question of the “neglect” of emptiness 
and achieving a comparison of mappo and postmodernist thought by disre­
garding Shinran’s conception o f evil are similar in their assumptions. 
Further, our consideration of both approaches suggests that different kinds of 
questions—questions of how the path functions and is traversed rather than 
of doctrine and conviction—in fact probe Shinran’s thought more deeply and 
may open up approaches to it that avoid falling into the paradigm of bifurca­
tion.
3. Toward a Holistic Approach to Shinran’s Thought
In order to achieve a sharpened, more illuminating comprehension of the 
lived significance of the Shin tradition now or at various points in the past, 
an approach is necessary that would, I believe, have two characteristics. 
First, it would grasp Shin Buddhist tradition at a point prior to bifurcation 
into Christian-like and nonChristian-like elements, and hence would not 
originate from the division of Shin into two aspects and from a choice of 
which is properly the focus of research and which is to be deemphasized. 
Second, an effective approach for a unitive grasp of Shin would bring the tra­
dition into a dialogical framework. By this, I mean that one would probe the 
resources of the tradition for presenting an intelligible self-understanding by 
being sensitive to the demands of engagement inherent in the tradition. There 
are significant reasons within Shin Buddhist tradition itself for adopting such 
an approach.
As we have seen, the common perception of Shin tends to locate it along a 
line of tension between poles of mainstream Mahayana Buddhism and 
Christian religiosity. This framework is often regarded as characterized by a 
polarity between “emptiness” as metaphysical view or meditative realization 
and faith as belief. The issue of engagement, however, can encompass vari­
ous forms of practice and conceptions of “ faith,” and thereby open up 
inquiry at a point prior to the distinction between them and thus prior to the 
objectification of Shin under existing Western categories. This is critical,
49
TH E E A S T E R N  B U D D H IS T  X X X III ,  1
because Shin is precisely that stream of Buddhist tradition that most radical­
ly brought into question the nature of genuine engagement, and sought 
through that questioning to discover a form of engagement both authentic 
and available to persons of all capacities and all modes and stations of life.
It is impossible here to discuss in detail the resources within the Shin tra­
dition that provide for an approach that is at once nonbifurcating and disclo- 
sive without the imposition of the usual polarized framework.19 I will simply 
mention and illustrate briefly several characteristics of the tradition that 
might contribute to the formation of such an approach.
The Character o f  Engagement in the Shin Buddhist Path
There are three central characteristics of the Shin Buddhist path that have not 
been adequately recognized, even in Japan, but now should be explored in 
order to achieve today a more penetrating grasp of the tradition. The Shin 
Buddhist path should be recognized to be centrally pragmatic in orientation; 
inherently concerned with language, most notably as the hearing of the 
teaching and the verbal act o f practice (nembutsu, saying the Name of Amida 
Buddha), but also in relation to the fundamental linguisticality of human 
existence; and dialogic in its dynamics and conceptual structures. When 
engagement with Shin is understood in these terms rather than in terms of 
Christian-like religiosity and nonChristian-like metaphysics, an approach to 
comprehension opens up that allows for interpretation of the texts, practices, 
and historical manifestations of the tradition with significance resonances 
with contemporary thought.
By pragmatic, I mean that although Shin is commonly viewed as a system 
of “faith,” it is not a set o f “truth-claims” or doctrinal propositions to be 
accepted as true descriptions of the cosmos in the ordinary sense. Rather, as 
Karl Barth notes, “it is not Amida or faith in him . . . which is the really con­
trolling and determinative power” in Shin tradition. It is often assumed that 
the relationship between practice and shinjin in Shinran’s thought is one of 
mutual exclusion, so that his radical development of the conception o f shin­
jin results in a Buddhism with no place for practice. In fact, however, as seen 
in the title Shinran applied to his magnum opus, The True Teaching, 
Practice, and Realization o f  the Pure Land Way (Ken jodo shinjitsu kyo gyo 
sho monrui), it is practice that holds the pivotal position in his thought. It is 
not that shinjin or persons’ entrusting of themselves to Amida’s Vow is
19 I have taken up these issues in Hirota 1993, and more briefly in Hirota 2000, pp. 186-195.
50
H lR O T A : On r e c e n t  r e a d in g s  of Sh in r a n
understood as itself a kind of, or replacement for, practice; rather, genuine 
practice (nembutsu) is enacted by persons who have attained (i.e., been 
given) the Buddha’s mind as shinjin (actual hearing of the teaching). 
Although Shinran states that shinjin is the true cause of birth in the Pure Land 
and of attainment of Buddhahood, this shinjin is inseparable from practice 
(nembutsu, Name as concretizing the practice of Buddha), and as in other 
forms of Buddhism, practice is the foundation of the conception of the path. 
Rather than “faith” simply as belief or worship, then, it is the category of 
engagement with the path that provides the appropriate means for approach­
ing Shin tradition and that allows for a vision of Shin within the context of 
Buddhist tradition. Moreover, it is the linguistic character o f the Shin path 
(hearing the teaching and saying the nembutsu) that constitutes its accessi­
bility to human beings regardless of capacity for conventional religious 
practice.
I will focus here on the third of the intertwined characteristics of engage­
ment mentioned above, its dialogical character. By this I mean not only that 
practicers understand that, while within their own historical and cultural con­
text, they must fully engage and be engaged by the tradition so that it 
becomes present to them, but further that the character of the engagement 
itself is understood to be inherently dynamic and transformative. I wish to 
point out aspects of engagement—the dialogical character o f its conceptual 
structures—in part to show how such an approach might be employed to 
avoid the imposition of the bifurcating framework described above, but also 
because it may offer hints regarding other approaches in which presupposi­
tions about Buddhist “philosophy” in the reading of texts or “ lay religiosity” 
as a sociopolitical category may tend to dissolve issues of the path.
The Dialogical Structures o f  Path and Reality in Shin Buddhism
Here, I will take up briefly the two sides or stances involved in engage­
ment—that of the practicer and that of Buddha or dharma (reality and the 
verbal disclosure of reality). By sketching the conceptual dynamic on each 
side as conceived and experienced by practicers in engagement, it will be 
possible to suggest how Shinran delineates the process of engagement and 
the transformed existence of the practicer. This will serve as a means for 
grasping the Shin path—including the shift in Buddhist tradition found at its 
roots from meditative practices and disciplines to conceptions of entrusting 
oneself to wisdom-compassion—without presupposing the patterns o f bifur­
cation we have considered above. In this way, it will be possible to stake out
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appropriate groundwork for the comparison of the Shin path both with other 
Buddhist traditions and with Christian forms of religiosity.
When focus is placed on issues of engagement, dharma in its verbal man­
ifestations is considered not as a system of abstract propositions or truth­
claims to be intellectually comprehended or believed with conviction but as 
an articulation of reality realized through a person’s engagement. Similarly, 
the practicers addressed or described in the teaching are not simply ordinary 
persons in the world, but those transformed through their engagement with 
dharma. Therefore, whichever side we begin with, we inevitably find it 
inseparable from the opposite side. If we follow Shinran’s basic organizing 
principle of the Buddha’s “giving” or transferring the virtues of wisdom­
compassion to beings (eko), and his statement that Amida engages beings 
and gives them all of the elements of the path—teaching, practice, shinjin, 
and realization—then it is natural to begin with the side of dharma.
Although this has gone unrecognized in the scholastic tradition, Shinran’s 
thought uniquely emphasizes two overlapping but distinct conceptual frame­
works by which Amida Buddha is conceived. One is the concept of two 
kinds of dharma-body—dharma-body as dharma-nature or formless reality 
and dharma-body as compassionate means (hoben hosshin, Amida Buddha). 
Here, Amida is understood as reality taking conceptual form in order to 
make itself known to ignorant beings. The second framework for under­
standing Amida is the concept of “fulfilled body” (hojin, sambhogakaya) of 
Buddha in all its virtuous adornments, which is the manifestation of 
Buddhahood attained through the fulfillment of bodhisattva vows and aeons 
of practice. For Shinran, Amida as fulfilled Buddha-body is above all char­
acterized by the unhindered light of wisdom that pervades all worlds and 
works to awaken all beings, for the Primal Vow that informs Amida’s 
Buddhahood was precisely the vow to bring all beings to supreme enlighten­
ment.
Perhaps the concept of the two dharma-bodies may be understood to pre­
sent a vertical paradigm by which Amida Buddha is seen to emerge into his­
tory and human awareness as form from formless reality. Amida as fulfilled 
Buddha-body would then be seen as a horizontal paradigm following a line 
of time formed by the narrative of the former king Dharmakara taking vows, 
performing bodhisattva practices, and at length becoming Amida Buddha 
and establishing the Pure Land. These two paradigms are interlocking but 
stand together somewhat like an optical illusion that can be grasped in either 
way, but only singly, not simultaneously.
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Amida is seen either as Buddha compassionately emerging from formless 
reality or as the culmination of aeons of practice to save all sentient beings. 
In fact, it is above all the entire causal narrative of Dharmakara-Amida that 
is the emergence o f dharma-body as compassionate means, that is, of com­
prehensible form. At the same time, the narrative progresses from the aeons 
of practice performed by Dharmakara toward Amida’s Buddhahood as the 
formless light of wisdom. That is, conversely, the narrative itself moves 
toward attainment of the formless.
On the side of the practicer, there is a similar interplay of conceptual struc­
tures. Here, it turns on two ways of conceiving reality and two consequent 
modes of engagement with it. Reality is conceived of as the Pure Land and 
as Amida Buddha. Engagement, then, is informed by aspiration for the Pure 
Land and entrusting of oneself to Amida Buddha. These are distinct modes 
of engagement, although here again this has gone unrecognized in the schol­
arly tradition. Elsewhere, I have applied the term “teleological” to the former 
and “interpersonal” to the latter to indicate the difference in orientation.20 If 
the former is comprehended as incorporating a horizontal vector character­
ized by spatial distances and temporal progression, the latter may be thought 
to embody vertical vectors of immediate relationship between practicer and 
Buddha. Since Shinran declares both the Pure Land and Amida to be the light 
of wisdom, we see that these two ways o f conceiving reality and two modes 
of engagement are interlocking. Nevertheless, as with the conceptual frame­
works applied to the apprehension of Amida Buddha, there remains an irres- 
oluble and dynamic interplay between them for the Shin practicer. Shinran’s 
notions that practicers realize wisdom-compassion as shinjin while remain­
ing foolish beings, or that they attain birth in the Pure Land in the present 
while remaining in this world, arise from this dynamic.
What is the significance of this dynamic interplay of conceptual structures 
that comes to light when it is asked how the teaching engages practicers, or 
how the engaged practicers understand themselves and the teaching? Here it 
is possible only to note that the two forms of conceptual interplay are of 
course not unrelated; rather, they are integrated in the purpose and function­
ing of the Pure Land path as Shinran understood it. This was to bring unen­
lightened beings, who cannot break through the structures of their own 
conceptuality, to an apprehension at once of the falsity of modes of thought 
and perception rooted in a delusionally reified self, and of reality that cannot
20 In Hirota 1991, pp. 17-45. See also Hirota 2000, pp. 40-65.
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be grasped by false conceptuality. In order to achieve this purpose, a kind of 
thinking is necessary that enables, through engagement with it, apprehension 
of inconceivable reality while remaining in the realm of human conception 
and linguisticality, or, in traditional Mahayana terms, apprehension of non­
duality through dualistic structures of thought. This thinking is manifested in 
the dynamic interplay of conceptual structures briefly outlined above, which 
are set in motion by the engagement of the practicer.
With regard to our theme here, it may be noted that there has been an incli­
nation not to recognize an approach to Shin through issues of engagement, 
which would grasp the tradition through its roots in Mahayana tradition. This 
has been the case both in the West and also in the sectarian scholastics o f the 
temple bureaucracy in Japan, where a well-defined orthodoxy has been a pri­
mary concern. Western scholars have focused not on the dynamic process of 
engagement, but on more congenial categories such as emptiness or co­
dependent origination as metaphysical concepts or doctrinal truth-claims as 
objects of faith. Both such categories are inappropriate to the core o f Shin. 
Rather, focus on engagement would allow not only for more precise under­
standing of Shin, but also for new and more pertinent comparison with 
Christian forms of religiosity, for example, by bringing into conversation 
Shinran’s conception of shinjin and the rich theology of love in Christian 
tradition. It is the dynamics of love—a term largely absent from Shin 
Buddhist thought—as paradoxically both divine gift and human capacity that 
might better illuminate the transformed existence of the person o f shinjin 
than faith or conviction.21 Moreover, it is the highlighting of the category of 
engagement that may be Shin Buddhism’s greatest contribution, as a long- 
enduring Buddhist tradition with a highly articulated doctrinal and commen- 
tarial heritage, to the field of Buddhist studies.
21 I have discussed a Pure Land Buddhist view of love in Hirota 1995, pp.l 13-115.
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